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We repon research investigating <he role of mental modeis in deduction. The first study
deals with conjunctive inferences (frorn one conjunction and two conditional premises)
ami disjunctive inferences (frora one disjunction ant? <he same two conditionals). The
secondstudy examines reasoning fron multiple conditionais such as: If e then b; Ifa <ben
b; lf b then c; What fotlows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning frorn
different sorts of conditional assertions, including condirionals based on if then, only if,
ant? un’ess. The paperalso presents researcb on figural effects in sy”ogistic reasoning, on
the effects of stmcture and believability in reasoning from double conditionais, ant? on
reasoning frorn factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these
studies support the model theory, pose sorne difficulties for rule theories, and show the
influence on reasoning of <he linguistic strucrure and the semantic content of problerns.
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En este trabajo presentamos varios estudios que investigan la construcción y manipulación
de modelos mentales en el razonamiento deductivo. El primer estudio trata sobre
inferencias conjuntivas (formadas a partir de una conjunción y dos condicionales) y
disyuntivas <formadas a partir de una disyunción y los mismos dos condicionales). El
segundo estudio examina la construcción e integración de modelos y el razonamiento a
partir de problemas de condicionales múltiples como: Si e, entonces b; Si a, entonces
b; Si b, entonces c. ¿Qué se puede concluir entre a y b? El tercer estudio aborda la
representación y el razonamiento a partir de los condicionales con a menos que y su
comparación con los condicionales formulados mediante si, entonces; sólo si; y a menos
que. Por último, brevemente, se presenta la investigación llevada a cabo sobre el efecto
de la figura en el razonamiento silogístico, el efecto de la estructura y la credibilidad en
los condicionales dobles, y las diferencias en el razonamiento entre los condicionales
fácticos, contrafácticos y semifácticos. Los resultados de estos estudios apoyan la teoría
de los modelos mentales, plantean dificultades a las teorías de reglas y ponen de
manifiesto la influencia sobre el razonamiento de la formulación lingúistica, la estructura
y el contenido semántico de los problemas.
Fa/abras clave: razonamiento deductivo, modelos mentales, condicionales
The research presenred in ti-fis paper is part of rwo projects funded by the Spanish Minisrry of Education ant? Science (PB94-0394
and PB9S-0020-C03-Ol) and by a grant to the last author from the US National Science Foundation (Grant BCS-0076287) to study
strategies u reasoning.
Correspondence concerning ¡bis article should be addressed to Juan A. García-Madruga, Opto. de Psicología Evolutiva. Facultad de
Psicología. UNEn. 28040 Madrid (Spain). E-mail: jmadruga@’psi.uned.es
125
¡26 GARCÍA-MADRUGA, GUTIÉRREZ, CARRIEDO, MORENO, AND JOI-JNSON-LAIRD
Deductive reasoning is a mental process that Ieads from
a set of premises to a valid conclusion, j.c., Lo a conclusion
that musí be true if the premises are true. As in olber fields
of human cognition, te study of deduction has grown
exponentially during Ihe last 35 years. Hence, the psycholugy
of reasoning now provides a more precise and detailed
knowledge about human deductive ability and its limftations
u different deductive inferences tan it did (bree decades
ago (e.g., see Evans & Over, ¡996). Urilike other areas of
cognition, however. the mercase in the research into
deductive inference has not lcd (o a concornitant grow(h in
(heoretical approaches. The deliberate search for unifled
Iheories” has prevented ¡he proliferation of mini-theories
of spccifle experimental paradigms. Hence, current studics
can be considered within the framcwork of two main sons
ol’ theory: dicories based on formal rules of inference akin
Lo ¡bose of logic (henceforth, rule theories) and theories
based on mental models (henccforth, model theories). There
are other theories of deductive reasoning, but they do have
a narrower purview. In this article, we repon sorne studies
carried mit by our research group in order to investigate the
model theory. But, before we describe our researeh, Wc
outline the two sorts of theory, because ocr expenimcnts
examine their contrasting prcdictions.
Rule iheories have a long history going back Lo Piagct,
aud before blm tu ilie nineteenth eentury logician, George
Boole. Recent rule theories follow ¡heir lead in posrulating
that human reasoning depends on formal rules of inference
akin Lo those of logie (Brame, 1978; Brame & O’Bricn,
1991; Rips, 1983, 1994). These tacit rules are used lo
develop a mental proof íhat a conclusion follows from the
premises, and each step ¡u the proof depends on a formal
rule, that is, a rule thai allows symbols Lo be rewritten solely
in virtue of their form, not their content. As an example,
consider tbe fullowing inference:
Jf Carlos is iii Salamanca. 11w,, Elisa Ls ¡u Albacete.
(‘arlos is ¡u Salamanca.
Tlierefore, Elisa is ¡u Albacete.
According tu rule flicories, reasoncrs extract the




They search their rcpertory of formal rules fon one that
can be applied to this logical furm. The heories postulate
the existence of well-known formal rule known as Modus
Ponei¡s (MP), which matches ihe form aboye. And so, there
is a proel iii a single step that dic cunclusion follows from
the premises (Brame & O’Brien, 1991; Rips. 1983, 1994).
It is a fact that from any set of premises infinitely many
valid conclusions fulluw, though most of them are trivial.
1-lence, aH of the following cunc¡usions follow:
flp ihen ej.
p.
Theré/bre, r nr r nr both.
Therefore, p nr r nr s, nr oíl.
And so on.
Only a ¡ugician oran insane individual is likely to draw
such conclusions, but they are valid, (bat is, ¡bey are true
granted that (he premises are true. One diff¡culty fon rule
heo¡ies is therefore ¡u determine which panicular conclusion
individuals tend tu draw. The theorics accordingly tend lo
be framed iii order tu evaluate given conclusions raLben ¡han
to account for [he conclusiuns that individuals draw
spuntaneously.
The principal predictiun of rule [heuries is that the
difliculty of an infcrence depcnds on thc number of inferential
steps (cach depending on a rule of inference) needed Lo draw
the conclusion. The theories also allow, howevei; that the
availability of a rule and the difficulry of applying it affcct
the difflculty of inferenees. But, ¡be theuries rely on post hoc
estimates of this factor froni daLa gathered from experimental
participants. In the case of ¡he preceding example, the
inference should bc veny easy because its derivation depends
on a single step using a simple rule of inference.
Mental model theories postulate that human beings
reasun, not on the basis of fonm, but un the basis of content.
They can construct mental models of situations both when
they penceive a real event and when they undenstand
diseourse. TEe mental processes underlying reasoning are
thenefone semantie, not syntactic (iohnson-Laird, 1983, 2000;
Johnson-Laird & Byrnc, 1991; Polk & Newell, 1995). The
first stcp is Lo understand the meaning of the premises. The
second step is tu use ibis understanding, knowledge of Pie
particular situation, and any pertinent general knowledge,
tu consruet a mental model of caeh of the possibilities
compatible with the premises. The ¡bird step is to fonmulate
a conclusion based un these mudels —a conclusion diaL makes
explicit in a parsimonious way sumething thai was not
asserted in any premise, un, if there is a given conclusion,
tu evaluate this conclusion with respeet (o ¡he mudels.
Tbc thcory of mental modeis tu wbich we adhere is
based on three main assumptions (see .lohnson-Laird, 2000).
The first assumption relates possibilities, which líe aL the
heart uf the Lheory, ¡o modeis:
1. Each mental mudel represents a possibility. The model
captures what is corumon tu the different ways in which the
pussibility rnight oceur.
An exclusive disjunetion, such as:
Elíher ¡Itere is a circle nr ihere is not a triangle
allows une pussibility or thc other, but nut both. Thc assertion
clicits mudeis uf two diffenent possibilities, une of the
presence of a circie, and une of the absence of a tniangle:
O
—A
wbere cach line denotes a separate mental mudel, and the
symbol ~‘ denotes negation and su -‘ A” denotes that
there is nut a tniangle. Individuals list these two possibilities
when they are asked tu siate what is pussible giveii LEeTherefnre, p.
MENTAL MODELS 127
assertion. MudeN can represen¡ relations among ¡linee-
dimensional entities un abstnact entities; they can be static
ur kinematic. They underlie visual images, tbuugh many
components of mudeis ane nut visualizable.
The second principIe concenns ¡he s¡ructune of mental
models, which is atin tu the structure of a picture ur diagrani:
2. A mental mudel is ¡conie, ¡bat is, its parts correspund
Lo the parts of what it represenis, and its strueture
connesponds tu ihe structure of ¡he possibility.
A major advantage of such a representation is that ihe
inspection uf an icunic nepresentatiun reveals ¡ruths over
and aboye ihuse uf ihe pnopositiuns tba¡ were used in its
construction (Juhnsun-Laird, 1983, p. 136). Consider, for
example, ¡he fulluwing pnoblem (fnom Byme & Johnson-
Laind, 1989):
The cup is on 11w right of 11w spoon.
The plate is mt me left of 11w 5,VOOfl.
The knife is infroní of tija cup.
Tije fork Ls iii froní of íhe pUne.
What‘s the relation hetween llie fork and iba kn¡fe?
The pnemises cali fon ¡he mudel:
plate spuun Cup
fonk knife
which represents ¡he entities as thuugh (bey were arranged
symmetrically un top of a table. Re mudel yields ¡he answer
tu ¡he question:
Thafork is on Iba left of iba knife.
Hence, the icunie natune uf ¡he model yields a conclusiun
oven and aboye the pnopositiuns used in constnucting the
model. Tbis aspect of modeis cuntrasts with a representatiun
based, say. un expressions in formal iugic. The mene
inspectiun of such a representatiun wuuld yieid no mure
¡han an inspection of ¡he list uf premises aboye. The icunic
nature of modeis also yields a plausible prediction. When
a descriptiun is consistent with mone ¡han une possibility,
it calis fon more tan une mudel, and the task uf making an
infenence is reiiably harder (Byme & Juhnson-Laird, 1989).
In u#den tu reduce the pnocessing load un wurking
memuny, mental modeis cunfonm ¡o a ¡bird pninciple:
3. Re pninciple uf truíh: mental mudels repnesent what
‘5 ¡rue acconding ¡o the premises, buí by defaulí not what
is false.
This principie applies at two levels. At une level,
mental mudeis repnesent uniy the pussibilities that are true
given a premise, as do the modeis uf ihe disjunc¡ion aboye.
At a luwer leve!, huweven, a mudel repnesents a clause in
¡he premises only wben it is true in ¡he possibility. Again,
in ¡he preceding example, the first mudel represents
explicitly wha¡ is tnue in that possibility, tha¡ is, ¡here is
a circie, but it does nut nepresent explicitly wbat is false,
¡bat is, it is false thai thene is nut a tniangle, and su tbere
is a tniangle. Likewise, tbe second model repnesen¡s
explieitly that it is true that ¡bene is nut a tniangle, but it
does not represent that it is false that thene is a circie. The
principie of trutb pustulates thai individuals by defaulí do
not nepresení what is false. But, ¡bere are exceptions that
uvenrule the principie. The theory pustulates that
infurmatiun abuut what is false is beid briefly in the
wurking memory in ¡he funm uf a mental fuotnute. If
individuals retain tbese fou¡nutes, they can construetfully
explicil mudels uf assentiuns. They can accundingly flesh
uu¡ their mental mudels of ¡be exclusive disjunctiun mio
tbe fulluwing fully explicil mudeis:
O A
-‘O -‘A
These mudels nepresent in a fully explicit way ¡he two
pussibilities neferred tu by the pneviuus exclusive disjunction,
and, as they illustrate, a true affirmative is used tu nepresent
a false negative propusitiun and a true negation is used tu
represení a false affirmative propositiun. Yet, the principIe
uf truth is ibe nomi. It yields mudels tbat are parsimoniuus,
because tbey do nul represent what is false.
A conjunction. such as:
Tbere is a triangle and a circie
yields a single mental model. conrespunding tu tbe single
pussibility compatible witb tbe asser¡ion:
O A
A conditional assentiun, sucb as:
If íbera isa circía, lijen ibera isa triangla
has twu mudeis:
O A
Tbe first mude! represents ibe pussibility in whicb ¡be
cunditiunal’s antecedent (ibera is a circle) and its consequent
(tizare is a tríangte) are botb true. Tbe second model,
represenied by the ellipsis, is a place-buider witb no expiieit
contení, wbich nepnesents ¡be possibilities in whicb ¡be
anteceden¡ is false. Juhnson-Laird and Byme (1991) adupted
a cumbersume nutatiun tu represent tbe footnotes un sucb
a mudel, but laten introduced a more et’fxcient repnesentatiun
in a cumputen implementatiun of the theory, whicb makes
foutnutes un mental mudels tu indicate what is false in
them. The implicit model is what distinguishes the mental
mudeis uf cunditionais frum the mental mudels uf
cunjunctiuns.
Individuals wbo netain tbe mental mudels can flesh out
their nepresentation intofi¿lly axplicil mudels, curresponding
eithen tu those uf a biconditiunal (if ibera Ls a circía tban






un tu thuse uf a regular cunditiunal (if íbera isa cirele iben
íbera isa triangle ant! if íbera isn’í a circie titan tizare may,




Table 1 presen¡s tbe mental models and ihe fully
explicií mudeis uf propusitiuns fonmed frum the set uf
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sentential cunnecLives piaying a major role in deductive
neasoning. The conditional and bicundidunal propusitions
share ¡he same men¡aI mudeis, but ¡beir mental footnotes
differ and aceordingly yield differen¡ fully explicit models.
Mental mudeis can nepnesent discuurse abuut real,
hypu¡betical, un imaginan>’ si¡uations, and ¡bey can nepnesen¡
knuwiedge in lung-¡erm memory. BuL, ¡be topie of (he
presení papen is thein role in deductive reasoning. If a
conclusion bulds in ah ¡be modeis uf ¡he pnemises, íbat is,
it has no cuun¡enexamples, it is necessary given ¡be
premises. If it hulds in a proportion of modeis, its
prubabilit>’ is equal ¡u tbat proportiun, granted ¡bat ¡be
mudeis repnesent equiprubable al¡ennatives. If it bolds in
aL leas¡ une mudel, it is possible given ¡be premises. And
if it holds in nune uf ibe models, iL is impossible given
the premises. Tbe theury iberefore unifies deductive
neasuning abuu¡ necessity, probabihity, and pussibility
(Juhnsun-Laind, 2000).
Tbe model Lbeony makes pnedictions aboní ¡be fuur
traditiunal funms of infenence based un cunditionais (Evans,
1993; iuhnsun-Laind & Byme, 1991):
lf p ¡ben q, p, ¡herefore, q. (modus pone/a: MP)
II p then q, no¡-q, ¡herefore, not-p. (modus ¡olleas: MT)
lf p ¡ben q, q, ¡berefore, p. (afflnniug tlw consequent pre~nise:AC)
lf p Iben q, no¡-p, ¡berefure, no¡-q. (denying tite antecedení prenhise: DA)
WiLh MP, tbe situatiun represented in categurical
premise, p, curnespunds ¡u tbe firsí model of ¡he
conditional, wbicb yields ¡he conclusion, q, and so ¡he
infenence sbuuld be easy. MT is anuther valid infenence.
Its categunical premise elimina¡es ¡be explicit mudel uf tbe
cunditional, and so it may seem ¡ba¡ no valid conclusiun
Table 1
Tite Mental Models and tite
can be dnawn (a common response). But, if reasonens
succeed in construc¡ing fully explicit modeis, eitben uf a
bicunditiunal or a regular condhiunal, the categorical
ehiminates alí bu¡ ¡he mudel: —, p —, q, and su tbe correc¡
eunclusiun can be drawn. MT should be mure difficult ¡bar,
MP, because it calís fur the extra cognitive wurk uf flesbing
out tbe mudeis and of holding (bem in working ¡nemury.
AC and DA are valid fon a biconditional in¡erpretation, bu
invalid fon a regular conditional intenpreíaíion. As Table 1
shows, ¡be cunditiunal interpnetatiun alluws ihe fully explicit
possibility of: —‘ p q, wbicb refutes butb inferences. But,
reasuners may draw ¡be AC conclusion fnom ¡be single
exphicil mental model of ¡he cunditional, wbeneas tbey
cannut dnaw tbe DA conclusion fnom tbe mental modeis
of ¡he cunditiunal. It fulluws (bat AC sbould be more
frequent ¡han DA.
MP is easier ¡han MT, and both rule ibeunies and (be
model ¡heory accoun¡ fon ¡be diffenence. Bu, Girottu,
Mazzuco, and Tasso (1997) used ¡he model Lheony tu pnedic¡
a sunprising nesuit. MT is easien when ibe categutical premise
is presented first ¡ban wben it is presenLed secund. Presented
f¡ns¡, i¡ provides an inidal negative mudel:
so ¡bat reasonens shuuld be more likely tu flesh ou¡ ¡bein
modeis of ¡he cunditiunal tu inelude ¡be cases wbere ¡be
an¡ecedent is false. Bynne and Tasso (1999) used ¡he mudel
theuny ¡u pnedict ano¡ber surpnising resul¡. MT is dnawn
mure ofien from cuuntenfactual ¡han from factual
condi¡iunals. A countenfactual of ¡be furm, If p bad
bappenad iban q would bave itappened, calis fur modeis
of bu¡h ¡he coun¡enfac¡ual si¡uatiun (p q) and tbe factual
Cunnective Mental modeis Fully expiicit modeis
p aná cj p
p nr else q p
q





















¡bat are true: “-“‘ denotes negation. and ...“ denotes
Eully Explicit Models Based oit tite Major Sentential Connectives
Ifaud only ifp titen q p
Note. TheJhlly explicil modeis represen¡ clauses (bat are false using negations
a wholiy iniplici¡ mudel. Each une represents a mudel of a possibili¡y.
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situatiun (-‘p —‘q) ¡bat ¡be cunditiunal presuppuses. Formal
rule theuries predict nei¡her phenomena.
A majur predictiun uf Pie mudel ¡heur>’ Ls diaL the mure
mudeis ¡bat neasuners have tu construct, tbe more difficult
tbe íask sbuuld be. It shouid take lunger and be mure prune
¡u error. Tbis and u¡ber predictions have bad an impact un
nesearcb. But, tbe ¡beun>’ has also been much cniticized (see
number 16 uf Behavioral auid Brain Sciences, 1993; and
Johnsun-Laind, 2000, fon a brief review uf ibe must necení
criticisms). One criticism is ¡bar tbe mude! tbeuny is vague,
untestable, and indis¡inguisbable frum tbeunies based un
formal rules uf inference. Anoihen criticism is ¡bat tbe ¡beun>’
has yet tu give an accuunt uf ¡be seman¡ic cuntent uf the
pruposiíiuns. One aim uf ¡be present studies Ls tu refute ¡bese
cri¡icisms. Tu ¡bat end, we report tbree main expeniments,
wbicb coneem nespectivel>’ ibe diffenence between reasuning
wicb cunjunctions and neasuning with disjunctiuns, (he
integratiun uf mudeis of multiple cunditiunals, and neasuning
from cunditiunais cuucbed using unlass. We also bniefly
pnesen¡ tbnee utber s¡udies.
Prupositional Reasuning:
Cunjunctions and Disjunctiuns
Rule and model ¡beunies explain deductive reasuning in
different ways, but butb sunts uf theory are able tu accuuní
fon many uf tbe principal nesul¡s in propositiunal reasuning,
i.e., reasuning tbat binges un tbe lugical pnupenties uf sucb
sentential cunnectives as ¡fi ajid, and Gr. Hence, the crucial
evidence cuncenns differences between the pnedictiuns of
¡be ¡wo surts uf theony. A relevaní siud>’ is Rips (1990. 1994)
because it examined prublems for wbicb tbe predictiuns uf
tbeunies diverge. As Table 2 shuws, each prublem in tbis
study has tbree premises.
Re finsí premise is either a cunjunetiun un a di~unctiun,
and ¡he nemaining premises are cunditiunais. The participants
in ¡he study liad tu evaluare whether un noÉ ¡he given
cunclusiun was necessany, nespunding eitber “Yes” , un else
No.” According tu tbe mudel tbeury, pnublem (1) calis
fon a single mental mudel uf tbe finst premise (a cunjunction),
and then ¡be meaning uf tbe twu cunditiunals can be
inLegnated tu yield ¡he single mudel:
p q n
Tbis model yields tbe cunclusiun, R, wbicb is necessany
because it bulds in alí the mudeis —in tbis case. tbe single
model— uf tbe premises. In cuntrast, prublem (2) calís fon
at least two mental mudeN uf ¡be first premise (a
disjunctiun), and the meanings uf ihe ¡wu cunditionais allow
tbis model tu be upda¡ed as folluws:
p n
q r
The same valid cunelusion, R, fuliuws, bur the task
sbuuld be harden because neasoners bave tu cuns¡ruct and
tu buid in wunking memuny a¡ least twu modeis of tbe
premises. The pnucess of constructing mental mudels frum
such premises bas been implemented in a computen pnugnam.
Tbe program also yields ¡be fuliy explici¡ mudeis of tbe
premises, wbich fon ibe presení prubiem are:
p -‘q n
-‘p q n
Because mure mudels impí>’ mure wunk, the ¡beur>’
accundingly predicts tbat pnoblem (1), wbicb calis fur a
single mental mudel, sbuuld be banden ¡ban problem (2),
which calís fur at leasí two modeis. Ibe tbeory makes ibe
same prediction fon prublems (1’) and (2’). In sum, tbe
cunjunctive infenences sbuuld be easien¡han disjunc¡ive unes.
Accunding tu rule theunies, ¡be cunjunetive prublems cali
fon the applica¡ion uf two rules dnawn from tbe basic set of
infenence scbemas posed by tite main ¡heuries (Brame, 1990;
Table 2
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Brame, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Rips 1983, 1994). Fon
instance, in Rips’s (1994) most neceut PSYCOP (sburt fur
Psychulugy uf Pruuf) system fur lugical neasuning, neasonens
need tu apply ¡be forward AND and IF elimination rules
(see Table 2). But, fon the disjunc¡ive prublems, ¡be rule
tbeuries pustulate a single rule ¡bat allows ¡be valid
conclusiun Lo be reached direc¡ly, ¡bat is, tbe Forward
Dilemma rule. You might suppuse thai the rule tbeuries make
¡be oppusite prediction Lo tbe model ¡beory, because (be
cunjuncLive pnublems cal! fon ¡be applicatiun of (wu rules
whereas the disjunctive problems cali fon tbe applicaLion of
only une rule. Huwever, acconding Lo Rips (1994), tbe
Dilemma rule is somebow banden” tu apply: It calís fur
¡he cuondination of ibree premises, whereas tbe rules (O be
applied ¡u ¡he cunjunctive infenences cali un!>’ for tbe
courdina¡iun uf une ur twu premises. Rips accondingí>’
cuncludes: There is no neasuri tu think that une uf these
methuds sbuuld be mueh easier ¡han tbe uther” (Rips, 1994,
PP. 368-369). In othen wurds, be argues ¡bat PSYCOP dues
nut pnedict any difference in diff,culty be¡ween the ¡wo sofls
uf pnublem. Rips (1990) found no signifxcant difference
be¡ween cunjuncLive and disjunctive pnoblems. Tbe diffenence
between negative conjunctive and negative disjunctive
problems, buwever, was in ihe direction predieted by the
mudel theury, even tbuugh it was uní>’ marginail>’ signifzcanL
(p .c .10). Rips (1990) accordingí>’ tuok tbe results ¡o
corruburate bis PSYCOP ¡heur>’.
In a series uf expeniments, the presen¡ autburs re-
examined the cunjunciive arid disjunctive inferences (García-
Madruga, Moreno, Carriedu, Gutiérrez, & Juhnson-Laird,
2001). Expenimen¡ 1 compared infenences in wbich ¡be
participants evaluated given cunclusiuns, as in Rips’s (1990)
original ¡ask, witb infenenees in wbich the panticipants drew
their own conclusiuns frum tbe premises. Rule ¡heuries do
no¡ predict an>’ significant difference between tbe iwu iasks,
because reasor¡ens shuuld use the same rules in both of them.
But ¡he mudel Lheony predicts that tbe neasuners’ strategies
are likely tu differ between ¡he twu tasks. In ¡he evaluation
task, ¡he neasoners can work backwards frum ¡he given
cunclusion. But, in ¡he cunsLnuciiun Lask, tbere is no given
cunclusion, and so ibis stnategy cannot be used. Reasuners
must genenate a conclusiun. It follows tbai ¡he constructive
task should be hander than the evaluative task. (A more
detailed analysis of ¡he possiblc sLna(egies is presenLed in
García-Madruga, Moreno Ríos, Caniedo, & Gu¡iénnez., 1999;
García-Madruga eL al., 2001).
Experimen¡ 2 was a replication uf the previous expeiimen(,
except (bat Llie premises were presented in a different orden:
The ¡wu conditiunal premises occurred befure the cunjunctive
or disjunctive premise, wbicb was presenLed last. Aecunding
Lo ¡he rule tbeuries, this change sbould bave no effeet un
performance. Buí, according tu tbe mudel theury, when ¡he
two conditiunal premises occur firsí, they cali fon tbe modeis:
y r
Él r
And Ihese modeis pneuccupy wurking memory duning
¡be prucessing of te ¡bird premise, and su ¡he difference
be¡ween ¡be cunjunctive and ¡be disjunctive problems sbould
be enhanced. Tbe predic¡iun is analoguus tu ¡he effec¡ of
urden un MT, wbere the inference sbuuid be harder wben
ihe cundi¡ional uccurs firs( tban wben it occurs second
(Legnenzi, Giro¡to, & Jubnsun-Laird, 1993, and for an
experimental curnuburation Girottu, Mazzoco, & Tasso, 1997).
TaiMe 3 presents Lbe results uf Experirnents 1 and 2. In
Experiment 1, ¡he evaluatiun task did nul yield an>’ diffenence
be¡ween ibe conjunctive and disjunc¡ive pnoblems. It
¡berefore replica¡ed Rips’s (1990) results. BuL ¡he cunstn¡ctive
íask shuwed ¡bat ihe cunjunclive prublems yielded a
significantly greaLer percentage of currecí cunclusiuns, butb
for the affirmative and the negative prublems (Wilcoxun
tesis, z = 2.24, p .02, une-tailed, and z = 2.35, p < .01,
one-tailed, respeciively). As ¡be table sbuws, (be conjunctive
pnoblems are at ceiling in buih eunditiuns, wheneas ihe
disjunc¡ive prublems show puorer perfonmance in ibe
cunstructive conditiun. In Experiment 2, ¡he presentation of
ibe conditiunals before ¡he conjunctiun un disjunetion did
nui bave a dnama¡ic effeci un ovenalí difficulty (aL leasí in
companison wiLb Experiment 1 —a companisun tba¡ is not
s¡ric¡ly valid, because it is beiween twu differen¡
Table 3
Tite Perceníages of C’orrecí Responses hy Type of Task aud Order Condition iii García-Madruga ci aL ‘s (2000) Experimants
1 and 2
% Curree¡ Afflrmative Problcms
Rips’s Order Inverse Order
Experimen¡ 1 Experimen¡ 2
% Corred Negative Problems
Ripss Order Inverse Order
Experimen¡ 1 Experimen¡ 2
Evaluation Cuns¡ruction Evaluation ConstrucLion Evaluation Cons¡ruc¡ion Evalua(ion Cons¡ruc(iun
Cunjuncdve problems 94.2 97.4 100 95.8 88.5 92.3 100 93.7
(89.2) (94.6)
Disjunc¡ive problems 86.5 76.9 77.3 81.3 82,7 66.7 79.6 77.1
(89.2) (Sl. t)
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experiments). Buí, in ¡bis case, tbe cunjunctive problems
were significantí>’ easier Iban tbe disjunctive pnublems buth
In ¡he evaluation ¡ask and tbe cunstructiun task. In alí tbe
groups, Lbe differences were signifzcant botb for affirmaiive
and negalive prublems (Wileuxun ¡ests witb p values ranging
from p < .05 top < .005).
Experiment 3 made a direct companisun uf the twu
urders uf presenting tbe premises in an evalualiun task.
1Jnlike Llie previous experiments, ¡be premises were
presented une at a lime un a computen scneen, and we
recorded both tbe ¡imes tu read Ibe premises, and tbe
latencies of Pie participants’ responses tu Pie given
conclusions. Table 4 presents ¡be resulís. Ibe ovenalí
times tu prucess the problems were fasten fon tbe
cunjunctive problems ¡ban for ¡be disjunctive prublems
(Wilcuxon ¡es¡, z = 2.07, p .02, une-lailed). Likewise,
in general, tbe times taken lo read tbe premises were
faster fur conjunclive problems tban fur disjunctive
prublems. Por Ihe latencies ¡o respund cornectí>’, ¡be
premises presented witb tbe cunditiunals lasí (Rips’s
1990 original order) sbuwed no significant difference
between cunjunctive and disjunciive prublems, but Lbis
diffenence was significant fon premises presented wi¡h
Llie cundiliunals first.
In general, ibe resulís curruburated ihe model theuny
and ran cuunten tu formal rule ¡beuries. Tbe cunjunctive
prublems cali fur tbe cunstructiun uf une mudel, wbeneas
ihe disjunctive prublems cali fur mure tban une mudel.
Rule ibeonies predic¡ eiiber absence uf differences un
diffenences in ¡be upposite direcriun. It is notewunthy íhat
no differences in Pie oppusite direetion tu Pie predictiuns
of Ihe mudel ¡beuny uccunned in any uf ¡te studies, and
uní>’ in tbe particular conditions uf Rips’s (1990) original
study did the diffenences fail lo reacb significance, perhaps
because of a ceiling effecL Tbe moral is íbat Lliene are
experiments that distinguisb between ¡he predictiuns uf ¡be
twu tbeonies, and (ba( in tbe present case tbey suppunt ¡be
mudel Ibeur>’.
Mudeis uf Multiple Cunditiunais
Anuther reasuning task bas enabled us tu cuntrast ¡be
rule and mudel tbeonies. In tbe” multiple conditionals” ¡ask,
Table 4
Tite Mean Reading
neasuners are given a series uf premises tbat are each a
cunditiunal, and tbey have tu draw a cunciusiun, if pussible,
in¡errelating ¡wu uf tbe clauses LliaL uccur in tbe premises.
In the fulluwing exaniple, tbe Ibree premises yield a direct
Iransitive chain from e tu e:
If e rite,, a
If a titen b.
If it titen c.
Whatfollows between a ant! c? [Answer: lf a riten c.]
The following pnublem Ls ver>’ similar, but has a different
initial premise:
¡fe titen b.
If a titen b.
Ifh titen c.
Wbarfollows hetween a ande? [Answer:Ifa titan c.j
Rule Lbeunies predic¡ ¡hat ¡he conclusiun is dnawn in an
idenlical way fon ¡be twu sons of pnoblem. Reasuners ignore
¡be flrst premise, and tben use twu rules uf inference: modus
punens (MP, as described earlier), and ¡he rule uf cunditiunal
prouf, wbicb alluws reasuners tu make a supposition or
assumptiun, P, aud then if they reach a cunclusiun, ~2,lo
disebange the suppusition by dnawing a cunditional
cunclusion: If P titen Q (see Brame, 1978; Brame &
O’Brien, 1991; Rips, 1983, 1994). Tbe denivatiun uf ¡be
conclusiun aceurdingí>’ proceeds as folíows fon botb
probleros 1 and 2:
a [Asuppusi¡inn, using CP]
it [MPapplied (o ¡be previous me and ¡be second premisa]
[MPapplied ¡o ¡be previuus me and ¡be ¡bird premisa]
If a ¡hen c [Discbarging¡he supposi¡ion using CPJ
It follows that there simulé he no reliable difficulty
belween ibe twu sons uf pnoblem.
In cuntrasí, tbe mude! tbeury predicts tbat neasuners
sbuuld cunstruet mental mudeis uf tbe set uf premises. Por
probleni 1, they sbuuld cons¡ruet the fullowing sequence
uf mudels (as does tbe computen pnugram impiementing
¡be Lbeury), wbich lake into accuunt eacb successive
premise:
First premise Second premise Tbind premise
e a e a be abc
Ihe final mudel yields tbe conclusion: if a titen e.
Prublem 2, bowever, calís fon ¡he cunstructiun uf two explici¡
mental models:
Times of tite Premises, tite Correct Response Latencies. ant! tite Overalí 7inzes (¡it Seconds) lii Experiment 3























Tbe resulting mudels yield ¡he same conclusiun as
befure: ifa titen e. In Lbis case, buwever, ¡be two explicir
mental mudels place a greater load un working memor>’,
and so ¡be inference shuuld be banden. Once again, tbe two
sorts uf tbeun>’ make different predictiuns abuu¡ reasoning.
In urden tu examine the cuntrasting predictiuns of tbe
twu tbeunies, we cannied out severa! expenimen¡s (Gutiérrez
Martínez, García-Madruga, Joiinson-Laird, & Carriedo
López, 2002). Wc repurt une sucb study, wbich we refer
tu hene as Expenimen¡ 4, in wbicb we used pnoblems
similar tu tbe unes aboye, except that ¡bey had fuun
premises instead uf ¡bree (see Table 5). Pnublem 3 in the
tabie called for ¡be eunstructiun of ¡bree explicit mental
mudeis, and so tbe ¡beur>’ pnedicts tbat it sbuuid be still
barder. In urden ¡u balance responses, tbere were also filler
i¡ems tu wbicb tbe cunrect response was notbing
foliuws.” Tbe participants wene postgraduates fnom several
universities. and we tested ¡bern individual!y using a
computer-implemen¡ed procedure (Mac-Laburatory
Reactiun Time). Tbe panticipants acted as thein uwn
controls and carnied uut ¡wu instances uf eacb prublem,
wurking under ¡heir uwn cun¡ru!. Tbe contents uf ¡he
prubiems cuncerned imaginary necipes and refenned ¡u
meals and couking ingredients. As Table 5 sbows, ¡be rule
theory predicts ¡bat pruhlem 3 sbould be casien ¡han ¡be
uther twu prublems, because its derivatiun is shunter. The
model tbeury, however, pnedic¡s a ¡rend uf increasing
difficulty oven ¡be ¡bree prublems: Prublem 1 should be
casier tban pnoblem 2, whieb in turn sbould be easier ¡han
prublem 3.
Tbe one-model problems yielded 90% conrec¡
conelusiuns, ¡he two-model and ¡bree-mude! problems bo¡b
>‘ielded 72.5% correct cunclusiuns, and the difference
between ¡be one-model and tbe mul¡iple-niudel prublems
was significan¡ (Wilcuxon test, T = 3, p = .025, une-tailed).
Tbis pa¡tem of results was ¡ypica! of ¡be u¡ber experiments.
It is compatible wi¡b ¡he mudel ¡heor>’, but quite cuntrar>’
¡o Llie predictiuns uf ¡he rule tbeunies (see the lengths of the
formal denivatiuns in Table 5).
Figure 1 presen¡s ¡he reading times for (be premises
and Lhe mean latencies of response. Tbe neading times fon
Lhe firs¡ and second premises did nu¡ differ significantly
fnum une sud uf prublem Lo ano¡ben. The reading time fon
tbe tbird premise, buweven, was significantí>’ longer fon
Table 5
Tite Titrae Sorts of Multiple Conditional
Mental Modeis of tite Premisas
Problem ¡ti Experin¡ent 4, tite Formal Derivations of Titeir Conclusicns, aízd tize
Prublems Formal rules uf denivation Men¡al mudeis
¡fe titen a. 5 unes: One men(ai model:
a titen b. a [Supposhion]
Ifb titen e. b [MP.! cabed
¡fe titen d. c [MP]
What fulluws be¡ween a d [MP]
and d? [If a titen a.] Ifa then d [CP]
¡fe titen it. 5 lipes: Twu men¡al modeis:
If a titen it. a [Suppositiun] e b cd
¡fi, titen c. b [MP] abed
ifc titan d. e [MP)
What follows be(ween d [MP]
a and d? [Ifa rl,en d.il ¡fa Llien d (CF]
If e titen it. 4 lipes: Three men¡al models:
If a titen it. a [Suppusirion]
¡fe titen it. b [MP] ebd
Ifit titen d. d LMP] abd
Wbat fulluws be¡ween Lf a ¡ben d [CP] cbd
a and d? [If a titen 4]
Note: The filía problems were invalid versiuns uf problems 2 and 3 in wbicb <be question was about ¡wo unrelated i¡ems (Whor























Figure 1. Premise reading times and response latencies (ir, seconds) in Expenimen( 4 with mul¡icunditiunals.
tbe ¡wo-mudel pnublems tban fur ¡he other sunts uf
pnublem. The neading times fon ¡he fuurth premise and
Lbe response latencies sbuw a trend witb une-mudel
prublems fasten than two-mudel pnublems, wbieh in turn
are fasten tban tbree-model problems. Wben we combine
tbe reading time uf tbe fuur¡b premise witb tbe latenc>’ uf
response, tbe nesul¡s corruburate tbe effect uf number uf
modeis: One-model prublems (11.99 secunds) wene deait
witb fasten tban twu-mode! problems (14.75 seconds;
Wilcoxon test, T = 14, p < .01, une-tailed), wbicb were
faster ¡ban tbree-model pnoblems (16,29 secunds; Wilcuxon
¡est, T = 20, p = .025, une-tailed). Tbis ¡reud was repeated
consistentí>’ in our utber experiments. In sum, ¡be
diffenence caused by ¡be need tu pnucess multiple mudeis
inereases oven the premises, wbicb is compatible witb the
inereasing load uf multiple mudels un wonking memur>’.
In contnast, rule tbeories make no specific predictiuns
abuu¡ tbe reasoning prucess: Tbe reasoners’ task is tu
extraet tbe logical funm of ¡he relevant premises, and ¡ben
¡o appl>’ formal rules of inference. Tbis task sbuuld be
sligbtly easien witb tbnee-model pnublems, because tbe>’
bave a sburter denivatiun.
Tbe increase in neading time fur tbe Lbird premise in Lbe
¡wo-model pnoblems can be at¡nibuted tu the mental
prucesses tbat these prublems nequine. Witb tbe une-mudel
and ¡hree-mudei prublems, tbe tbird premise calis uní>’ fur
repearing an openatiun tbat has already been penfunmed fur
Llie .secund premise: fon tbe one-model prublems, the
integnatiun uf a new element; and fur tbe tbnee-mudel
prublems, tbe creatiun uf a new mude! because direct
integratiun is impossible. But, witb the Lwo-mudel problems,
a new operation is necessary: Tbe element, e, has tu be
integnated in¡o tbe íwo independen¡ mudels cunstructed
previously. Ibis multiple integration evidently places a luad
un wurking memory. Tbeneaf¡en, tbe neading time for the
fuurth premise and tbe latency ¡u respond appear tu neflect
tbe number of mudeis tbat bave tu be helé in wurking
memor>’ (see also García-Madruga, Mureno, Carriedo, &
Gutiérrez, 2000).
One complicatiun is ¡bat diffenent individuals may
develup diffenent stnategies fon cuping witb Lliese pnublems.
One such strateg>’, wbieb was fonmulated by Walter Scbaeken
(personal communicatiun) fon spa¡ial reasoning pnub!ems,
is tbat reasonens ma>’ nu¡ cunstnuct ah pussibie mudels, but
instead seek tu tag a single mudel witb altemative
pussibilities. Reasoners knuw ¡bat tbe fuunth premise is tbat
last une befone the final questiun, and so anu¡her plausible
stnateg>’ tu minimize the pnocessing load un wunking memun>’
is tu suspend integra¡iun until furtben infunma¡ion about tbe
problem is pruvided by tbe questiun i¡self (see Gutiérrez,
Gancfa-Madruga, Canriedo, & Moreno, 2000). Tbese
possibilities calI fur furtber inves¡igation, panticularly s¡udies
that cali for tbe panticipan¡s tu tbink aluud as tbey reason.
Such studies have indeed sbown tbat diffenent individuals
develop different strategies (Van den Henst, Yang, & Johnson-
Lairé, in press).
Mental Mudeis and Fuun Surts uf Conditiunal
Tbe study of conditiunal reasuning bas focused un
cunditiunais uf the fon: If~ riten q. Other furms uf sentence,
boweven, can be in¡enpreted as cunditionals depending un
their cuntent amé cuntext (Jubnsun-Laird & Byme, in pness).
Ibe “cuntrapositive” assertiun: if not q riten nor p, witb
neutral contents is logicalí>’ equivalent tu ifp titen q. Ibe
uní>’ if’ asser¡iun: p only ifq, wi¡b neutral contents is
lugieally equivalent tu if p titen q. And tbe “ uniess”
assertiun: ,iot p unless q, is also logicail>’ equivalen¡ Lo ¡fp
titen q. Pbilosupbens bave traditiunail>’ consideneé assertions
isí premisa 2nd premisa Srd premisa 4Ih premisa RL. 4 lh premisa + RL.
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uf the furm nor p unless q tu be semantical¡y equivatent tu
tfnoí q titen flor p (e.g., Quine, 1972; Reicbenbacb, 1947).
Geis (1973) argued that a mure accunate paraphrase was not
p axcepí ifq, but Fillenbaum (1976, 1986) angued instead
that a more accurate parapbrase was p only if q, because
the meaning of butb asser¡ions makes tbe negative pussibulit>’
mure salien¡. Wright and Hulí (1986, 1988) cumpared nor
p unless ¿y with Ifnor ¿y titen norp in a sedes uf expeniments
in wbicb p neferred tu an actiun and ¿y refenred tu a cunéitiun.
Tbeir participants had mure difficuity neasuning witb unless
assertiuns ¡han witb the cunéitionais. They accurdingí>’
cuncluded (bat tbe twu sonts uf assertiun bave different
mental representa(iuns.
Accurding tu rule theonies, tbe neasuning prucess with
tbe fuun sorts of cunéidunal depends un transfonming tbem,
whene necessany, intu conéitiunais uf tbe ¡firiten sort (cg.,
Brame, 1978). Ihe transfonmatiun fon only ifassertiuns and
for unless assertiuns yieids if nor ¿y titen nor p. Tbereaften,
¡te standard rules of inference fur cunditiunais can be applieé
tu these ¡nansfunmatiuns. In contnast, (he model ¡beun>’
postulates that only ifand unless assentions bave twu explicit
mental modeis, because their meanings make Llie negative
cases salient (Fi!lenbaum, 1976, 1986). Tbey differ uní>’ in
whicb uf tbe twu mudels is more salient. But, alí four
assentiuns bave the same ful!>’ explicit mudels curnespunding
tu thuse fon ¡f-íben assentiuns (see Table 1). Tabie 6
summanizes ¡he mental mudeis and ¡he formal ¡ransfonnatiuns
fon the fuun sonts uf cunditiunal.
Each of tbe fuur sons uf cunditional can be paineé with
an affinmation or denial uf a categunical premise in urden ¡u
yield tbe foun surts uf inference: MP, MT, AC, and DA (see
Table 6). Rule theunies reí>’ un ¡be same infenential steps
fon MP, and fon MT, negandless uf the furm of tbe
cunditiunal, ané acconding tu tbein denivatiuns MP sbuuld
be easier than MT. Similaní>’, given ¡he mental transiatiun
uf.the prupositiuns, tbe same prediction sbuuld huid fon p
only if ¿y ané notp unless ¿y (see Table 6). Tbe model tbeony
also pnedicts that MP shuuld be casientan MT fon (fp titen
¿y and if noí ¿y titen not p. But, p only if ¿y ané nor p unless
¿y bu¡h bave twu explicit mental mudels, ané tbese mudeis
alluw a dineet infenence uf botb MP and MT wi¡bout ¡be
need tu flesh out into fulí>’ explieit models. Tbe
cunsequences are ¡wufuld: First, ¡be diffenence in difficulty
between tbe twu inferences shuuld disappean; ané secund
MP shuuld be banden fon (bese assentions (han oréinar>’
conditionals, because working memor>’ is preuccupied by
twu mental mudels. Bu¡h preéictions bave been curruburated
(see Jobnson-Laind, Byme, & Schaeken, 1992; cf Evans,
Clibbens, & Ruud, 1995).
In une of ¡heir experimen¡s, whicb we refer tu bere as
Expenimen¡ 5, García-Madruga, Caniedo, Moreno, Gutiérrez
ané Scbaeken (2002) examined reasuning wi¡b ¡be fuur softs
uf cunditional in a response evaluatiun ¡ask. Tbe cun¡en¡ uf
tbe pnob!ems referned tu Ietters un une side of a card and
numbers un tbe utber side of tbe cané, fon example: If titare
Ls an A o,z one side titen titare is a 4 on tite otiter sida. Tbe
expeniment was nun under computen control. After ¡he
panticipants liad read tbe instructions ané carneé out sume
practice tnials, the expeniment prupen began. On eacb ¡rial,
une of the four sun¡s of conditionais appeaned un the
computen sereen. The participants read ¡he sentence ané then
pressed tbe space bar Tbis response lcd tu ¡be presentatiun
of ¡he categunical premise. When (be panticipants bad read
it, te>’ pressed ¡he space bar again, ané a putative conclusiun
appeared un the scneen. Tbe participants bad tu decide
wbethen Llie cunclusiun was necessanily true given tbe
premises, necessanily false given (be premises, un neitben,
and ¡he>’ made their response by pressing une of thnee
different keys.
Table 7 presen¡s the pencentages uf responses enéursing
(be four sun¡s uf infenence and tbe combined latencies tu
nead Llie categunical premise ané (o nespuné. We fucus hene
un wo principal nesults pertinen tu tbe contnast be¡ween
rule and model tbeonies. First, as tbe mudel tbeon>’ predicts:
Table 6
Tite Mental Models for Four Sorts of
to Braine’s (1978) Rule Titeory
Conditional, and tite Possible Formal Transformations of tite Condihonals Aeeording
Condhiunals Mental mudeis Formal ¡ransforna¡ions
¡fp titen ~ p Él
Ifnotqtitennotp ‘Él
p only (f ¿y p Not p ¡f otiter titan ¿y
‘Él Ifnotqtitennoíp





Tite Percentages of Inferences ant! Tizeir Latencies in Seconds ffn Brackats) for Eacit Son of Conditional Sentenca ant!











Ifp titen ¿y MP: 98 (2.5) DA: 63 (5.0) AC: 75 (3.9) MT: 78 (5.5)
Ifnot ¿y titen noíp MT: 63 (5.6) AC: 64(5.3) DA: 66(4.6) MP: 96(3.4)
p only u ¿y MP: 94 (3.3) DA: 69 (4.7) AC: 89 (2.9) MT: 90(3.9)
Nor p unless q MP: 76 (4.2) DA: 56 (5.4) AC: 86 (3.0) MT: 86 (4.6)
Note. MP = Modus Ponens; AC = Affirming Lhe cunsequen¡; MT = Modus Tollens; DA = Denying <he antecedent.
MP Ls easien ¡han MT fon the twu cunditiunais (¿fp titen ¿y,
~fnot q titen noí p), but tbe éifference éisappears fon ¡te
otben two assertiuns 4v only ¡f ¿y, nor p unless ¿y). Tbe
snteraction was significant both ter accuracy nad latency. It
is, of cuurse, cuntran>’ ¡u tbe predictiuns of tbe rule ¡beur>’.
Seconé, as Table 7 sbows, AC cunclusiuns occurred more
uf¡en ané mure rapidí>’ fon only if ané unless assentions tban
fon ¡be utber two sunts uf cunéitiunal. (These nesults were
ah sta¡isticall>’ significant, bu¡ we spare reaéers tbe details.)
Ihis pattem fur only ~fhas heen demuns¡rated befure (Evans,
1977, 1993; Evans & Beck, 1981; Evans, Ciibbens, & Ruod,
1995). Wbat tbe>’ also curnoburate is Evans and Beck’s
(1981) b>’puthesis ¡bat p only uf q ané not p unless q calI
fur mudeis in wbicb tbe unéen of ¡enms Ls reversed:
ponlyif¿y notpunlessq
q p
-‘q —p q p
Cunditionais based un unless bave sume idius>’ncratic
propendes. One inference tbat is particularí>’ éifficul¡ is DA:
Nor p unless ¿y.
Not p.
Titenefore, ¿y.
It uccurs ¡ess uften aud mure stuw¡y than with the uthen
sons uf conditiunal (cf García-Madruga, Caniedo, Moreno,
Gutiérrez, & Scbaeken, 2002; Scbaeken, García-Madruga,
& D’Ydewalle, 1997). A small but noticeable proportiun of
participants, in fact, drew the conclusiun: ¿y. Acconding tu
Scbaeken, et al. (1997), tbe response resul¡s from a
superficial “ matching strategy” rathen Iban frum a proper
interpretatiun of tbe premises: Tbe minor premise, not p.
matcbes ¡be f,rst clause in tbe unless assentiun, aud su
individuals dnaw a cunclusion that matches ¡he secuod clause.
Sucb idiusyncrasies, and ¡be difficult>’ of cuping wi¡h
unless, might be ameliorated when tbe cun¡ent uf problerus
refens tu commun events in dail>’ life, such as cunditional
wannings ané tbreats (see Fiílenbaum, 1976, 1986), fon
example:
Thu will nor pass tite exarn unless you srudy more.
Do not travel hy can unless you raka along citains.
In a furthen stud>’, Experiment 6, we examined
partieipan¡s’ reasoning with ¡be same fuur propusitiuns fnum
¡he pnevious expeniment but witb fuun different sunts uf
conteut (Carriede, García-Madruga, Gutiérrez, & Moreno,
1999). Ibe first cun¡ents wene abstnac¡, ¡bat is, as in tbe
previuus experiment, tbe assertiuns neferred Lo letters aud
numbens un cards, fur example,
Tlzere isn ‘t an A on one sida unless titare is an 1 on
tite otiter side.
fle second contenta were neutral: The assertiuns neferred
tu ¡he co-occurrence uf twu events but witb no causal nelation
between tbem, fur example:
1 don ‘t drink wine unless 1 eat meat.
The tbird cuntents wene everyda>’ wamings:
Don ‘1 use a welding tone/u unless you weanprotective
eye covering
Tbe fuurtb cun¡ents were everyéay ¡bneats:
Don ‘t ,nake niara spelling mistakes unless you want
to repear tite sentence ten limes
The panticipants bad tu write éown tbein cunclusiuns tu
¡be fuun suds of infenence, un tu nespund tbat tbere was no
cunclusiun.
Table 8 pnesents tbe percentages of inferences fon tbe
feur sunts of cuntents fon te unless assentiuns. A.lthuugh
MT inferences tended tu be easier ¡han MP infenences
(exeept fon Lbe arbitrar>’ cun¡ent), tbe difference was nu¡
significaní ter any of the eontents. There was a similar
tendenc>’ fon AC tu be easien ¡ban DA, wbich was
signifucant fur the abstnac¡ niatenials (Wilcuxun test, z =
2.49, p = .02, two-tailed). Akhuugh Pie matching response
tu DA inferences oceurreé fur abstract (14%) ané neutral
cuntents (8%), it did indeed disappear with tbe tbreats and
warnings. This phenumenon suggests that ¡he everyday
con¡ents belpeé reasunens tu make a pruper in¡ewnetation
uf tbe premises. Finally, tbe tbreats yielded a greater
prupurtion uf inferences, wbich suggests tbat tbe
panticipan¡s ¡neated tbem as bicunditiunal, tbat is,
compatible wi¡h unly Lwu possibihities, and su alí foun sons
uf inference are vahé, ané ¡bene is no pussibilit>’ of ¡be
fon: -, p q, tu bluck AC ané DA.
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Table 8
Tite Pencentages of inferential Responsasfor ‘Unless” Condirionalsfor Each Sorí of Co/ziení ant! Eacit Fon/II cf Infenance
















Abstract 75 44 (42) 81 (14) 72
Neutral 72 61 (31) 58 (33) 81
Warnings 77 58 (39) 64 (36) 81
Threats 81 89 (8) 94 (0) 94
Note. MP = Modus Ponens; DA = Denying ¡he antecedent; AC = Affirming ¡be cunsequent; MT = Modus Tullens.
Ilinee Recent Studies
In tbis sectiun, we examine three pbenumena: tbe figural
effect in s>’llogis¡ic neasoning, tbe effects of cuntent un
neasonzng frum ¡wu conditiunal premises (“ duuble
conditiunais” ), ané neasuning from counterfac¡ual
cunditiunais. In eacb case, ¡be results are neievan¡ tu tbe
tbeuny uf mental models.
Figura! Fifecís iii Syl/ogistic Reasoning
Syilugisms are deductive anguments madeupuftwu
premises and a conclusion in wbich each assertiun is baseé
un a quantifier, sucb as ah, saíne, un ¡zona. A typieal
syllogism has ¡be folíuwing forro:
Alt tite A ana B.
Nona of tite B ¡5 C.
Titerefore, nona of tite A Ls C.
wbere A and C are tbe ené tenms ané su occur in ¡he
conclusiun, ané B is ¡he middle-term tbat uccurs in bo¡h
premises. In ¡be traditiunal furmalizatiun of syllugisms, ¡bere
are four surts uf assertion knuwn as “mouds”
AII X ana E
Sonia X ana Y
No X is Y
Sonia X are not Y
Tbere are four pussible arrangements of ¡he rerms in tIte
premises knuwn as “figures”
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
A-E E-A A-E E-A
B-C C—B C-E B-C
Tite figura> effect Ls arz effec¡ en ¡he forni of conclusiuns.
fur example, Figure 1 tenés tu >‘ield conclusions uf ¡he furm:
A C, whereas Figure 2 tenés ¡u yield conclusiuns of tbe
furm: C — A (see Dickstein, 1978; García-Madruga, 1982;
.luhnsun-Laind, 1975). Por ¡he »‘mme¡rie figures, 3 aud 4,
there are also sume weaker elfecís (García-Madruga, 1982;
Juhnsun-Laird & Bara, 1984). According tu ¡be model ¡heory,
reasuners builé a model fur eacb premise and integrate ¡bese
mudeis, ur tbey can update ¡heir model uf ¡be first premise
witb infurmation frum ¡he secuné premise. Tbe dinectiun uf
the cunclusiun depenés un tbe positiun uf ¡be end-tenms (A
and C) in ¡be uveral1 model of tbe premises, which in turadepenés un ¡be urden in whicb informatiun enters working
memury (Jobnsun-Laird & Bara, 1984). Tbe mudel uf the
premises in Figure 1 is construeted b>’ aéding the model uf
Lbe second premise tu tbe ené uf the fzrst premise, because
¡te rnidd>e terms are adjacent. 1-lence, [beconclusion wil!
tené tu be in ¡be A - C directiun. BuL, in urder tu make ¡he
miédie terms aéjacent in Figure 2, neasoners mus¡ reverse
the urden uf ¡be premises. Tbe resulting mudel will ¡ené tu
yield a cunclusiun ir, ¡he C - A directiun. It folluws, un
addition, ¡bat inferences in Figura 2 sbould be more diffzcuít
¡han tbuse in Figure 1, because of ¡he need tu consider the
premises in ¡beir upposite orden. Tbis predictiun was borne
uut in an expeniment in wbich we used un-une measures of
neading time for tbe secuné premise. The nesults sbuwed
¡bat prucessing ¡be seconé premise tuuk significantí>’ longer
in Figure 2 ¡ban in Figure 1 (Espino, Santamaría, & García-
Madruga, 2000a).
Espinu, Santamaría, ané García-Madruga (200Gb) canied
ou¡ a series of expeniments using a new tecbnique tu measure
¡be mental activation uf ¡be terms wber, ¡be participanís read
¡be premises ané made inferences from ¡hem. Tbeir task ~vas
tu decide wbe¡her oc nut wurd.s had occunned in [hefurrr,ulatiun
of ¡he probleni. Tbese wurds included ¡bose ¡bat corresponded
tu ¡be ¡erms uf ¡be premises: A, E, and C. The ¡ime ¡bey spent
responding tu ¡be Éluestiofl abou¡ une uf [he¡erms indicated
its activation un accessibility, amé revealed sume aspects of its
represen¡atiofl in tnatnory drzi-ing syliogistic reasoning. The
most striking result occunned af¡er tbe participan¡s bad read
¡be secund premise. Fon Figure 1 (A — E; E — C), ¡he inos¡
active ¡erm was C. whicb is ¡he end-term of ¡be secund premise
amé ¡he mus¡ recen¡ ¡erm tu be represented in ¡be mudel uf
¡he premises. In contrast, fon Figure 2 (E — A, C — E), Pie
mus¡ active ¡crin was A, wbicb is ¡be end-term of ¡he f,nst
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premise, but is (he most reeen¡ ¡en tu be represented in ¡be
mudel granted tbat tbe premises are pnucessed in reverse order.
The resul¡s uf tbis stud>’ were Llie subject uf a debate with
Mike Oaksfurd in Tit¡nking ant! Reasoning (Oaksforé, 2001;
Santamaría, Espino, & García-Madruga, 2001). But, they
curruburate the mudel ¡beuny’s prediction tbat reasuners tend
tu consider ¡be premises of s>’llugisms in Figure 1 in the urden
in whicb the>’ are síated, wbereas tbe>’ ¡end tu reverso [be urden
of the premises in Figure 2.
Logical Sirutture ant! Bel¡evab¡l¡ty ¡u Dcuitla (‘onditionais
Santamaría, García-Madruga, ané Johnsun-Laird (1998)
examined reasuning from éuuble cundi¡ionals such as:
If Coneita stut!¡es titen site passas tite exam.
lf Concha pa.sses tite exani titen site finisites rita tota-se.
We manipulated the figure of tbe premises as in ¡he study
of syllogisms, using tbe four diffenent figures sbuwn in tbe
previuus sectiun. We also manipulated Use believability of
tbe two forms uf putative cunditional cunclusion. Tbe
preceding premises are in tbe A — B, E — C figure, ané ¡he
A — C cunclusiun is vahé ané believable:
If Contrita studies titeiz site finisites tite caurse
whereas tbe converse cunclusiun (C — A) is invalid and
unhelievahle:
If Contrita finisites tite coarsa riten site siudias.
With different conten¡s, ¡he same figure >‘ields oppusite
effects. Fon example, from tbe folluwing premises:
If María is itungry riten site ears an aflanicon snack.
«María aaís an afiernoon snaek titen site itas a higití
dintier
¡be A — C cunciusion:
If Maria is itungry titen site itas a ligití dinnar
15 vahé but unhelievable, wbereas ¡be C — A conclusiun:
lf María itas a ligití t!i,rner titan site it itungry
is invalid but believable.
Wc carneé uut three expeniments in whicb we measured
butb tbe validity of tbe conclusions that the participants
drew and tite response latencies. Panticipants dnew valid
cunclusiuns more uften ané more rapidí>’ wben [bey wene
behievable than wben the>’ were unbe!ievable. Likewise,
inferenees in Figure 1 were easier antA faster than inferences
in Figure 2. Conditiunals in Figure 1 (lf A tite,¡ B; JfB titen
C) >‘ield tbe fulluwing mental models:
a b e
If tbe explicit model is believable, participants will dnaw
Llie valid cunclusiun, ¡fA riten C, with no difficult>’. But, 4
¡be model Ls unbelievable, sume participan¡s will tend tu
rejeet it ur Lry tu cunfinm tbe invalid but believable
cunclusion, IfC titen A. Cunéitionals in Figure 2 (ifB titen
A; IfC titen B), cali for reasoners Lo construct tbeir mental
inudels starting witb ¡he second premise:
c b a
As tbe accuracy uf tbe responses and tbeir latencies
showeé, ¡he prucess was mure diffscult ané slowen.
Cnunrerfaemual conditionais
Counterfactual cunditiunals bave provided a source uf
infurmatiun tu evaluate theuries of reasuning and uf cugnitive
deve!opment (Riggs & Petersun, 2000). According tu the mudel
theory’ (Jubnson-Laird & B>’me, 1991), a cunditional, sucb as:
If Carlos itad playad titen tite icauz would itave won
can be interpreted counterfactuafly, that is, as implying [bat
Carlos did nut pía>’ ané tbe team did nut win, but in the
case cuntrar>’ tu ¡he facís in whicb Carlos bad p!ayed tbe
team wuuld bave wun. (Sucb conditiunals also hayo an
interpnetation in wbich tbe speaker dues not know wbe¡hen
un nut Carlos played, but asserts ffiat had be played ¡he team
would bayo won.) The cuunterfactual in¡enpreta¡iun calis fon
two explicit mental mudeis, une repnesenting tbe facts ané
tbe utiter [he cuunterfactual pussibility:
Facts:
—, Carlos pla>’ed. -, Tbe team won.
Counterfactuai pussibilities:
Carlos played. The ¡eam wun.
These niodels immedia¡ely yie!é butb tbe MP ané the
MT infenences, and su unce again ¡be normal éifference in
éiffzculty between tbem, wbich we descnibed carlien, shuuld
disappear with counterfactual cunditiunals. Rutb Byme ané
ben cu!leagues corroborated this predictiun in an expeniment
in whicb ¡be participants drew tbeir uwn conclusiuns (B>’rne
& Tasso, 1999). Moreno-Rius, García-Madruga, ané Byme
(2002) bave also rep!icated tbe nesult using an evaluation
task. Tbese autburs also used a type uf cunditiunal known
as a senufaetual:
«Carlos bat! playad, tite team would síllí itave won.







U Ls muot puint whetber any utber pussibulity is
compatible with tbe tnutb uf ¡he assertion, but presurnably
its trutb allows, sa>’, [bat if Juan bad pla>’ed [be team would
have lost, ané su sueh pussibilities are nepresented by Pie
implicit model. Talle 9 sumnianizes tbe mental mudeis fur
factual, counterfactual, and semifactual cunditiuna!s.
~l’hemudels for the semifactual cunditional sbuuld
impede alí ¡be standard conditiunal inferences except fon
MP. For example, ¡be premises fon MT:
If Carlos izad playad, rite teanz would síLlí haya won.
In fact, rite íeam did not win.
seem almost seif-cuntradictury. Tbey do nut permil tbe
conclusion:
Carlos did nol play.
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because it currespunds Lo the factual pussibilit>’. The ¡ruth
of tbe minor premise calís fon flesbing uut tbe implicit
mudel and fon tbe intruductiun uf sume new factor, sucb
as tbat Juan played. Hence, the ¡heony pnedicts that
reasoners are more likeiy tu respond thai diere Ls no valid
conclusiun. Fon DA, tbe categunical premise Carlos did
nor play currespunds tu tbe facts of tbe mat¡er, and
reasoners sbuuld respond: tite tearn won. Tbis inferences
is o¡iuse, however, because it dues correspuné to [be facts
of [he matter. Fon AC, tbe categurical premise rite teanu
won is compatible witb eitber uf [be two mental modeis,
whicb yield uppusing cunclusions, and so ¡bose participants
who keep bo¡h mudeis ir, miné shuuld respuné ¡bat ¡here
is no valid cuncíusiun.
Tbe nesults of tbe expenimen¡ sbowed that MP ané MT
were equal»’ likely ¡o be drawn fronz a euunterfactua>
cunditional, wbereas fon botb factual and semifactual
conditiunals, MP was much more likely tu be drawn tban
MT. Fon semifac[uals, most responses [u MT and AC were
that ¡bere was no vahé cunclusion, but neasuners did draw
tbe cunclusiun frum DA correspunding tu ¡be faets of tbe
ma¡ter. me la¡encies uf tbe responses neplicated [be results
of Lhe accunacy measune. Likewise, the neading times fon
the coun¡erfactual and semifactual conditiunals were lunger
tban tbuse uf ¡be factual cunéitionals. Tbis iatter nesult fits
tbe assump¡ion that reading cuunterfactual and semifactual
cunditionais leads Lo tbe constructiun of ¡wu explicit mental
mudeis, wbereas reading factual cunditionais leads tu the
constructiun of unly une explicit mental model. The same
factor accounts fon ¡he luwer frequenc>’ uf inferences frum
counterfactual and semifactual cunditionals ¡ban frum factual
cunditionals.
Tabie 9
Tite Mental Mot!als for Titrea Sorts of Conditional, ant! tite















Moreno-Rius ané García-Madruga (in press) have
replicated tbe results witb semifactual ané factual
cunditionais in a develupmental study uf fuur age gruups:
7, 11, and 14 year-uld children, ané adults. The
deveJopnien¡al pattern fon factual conditionals curroborated
the une in the literature (Barnuuillet, Grosset. & Lecas, 2000;
Delval & Carretero, 1979; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993):
a cunjunctive interpretation (une mudel) in tbe first years,
a subsequent biconditional interpre¡a¡iun (¡wu mudeis), ané,
lastly, tbe conditional in¡erpretatiun (three mudeis) unly in
ulder children and adui¡s. The mude! ¡beor>’ pruvides a
simple explanatiun uf tbese nesults: lndividuals develup a
greater capacity of worl<ing memury, and so can fiesh out
models in the urden uf tbeir impur¡ance. Witb semifactual
condi¡ionais, <be participan¡s of alí ages sbuwed a luwer
frequene>’ of acceptance uf inferences. But, witb increasirzg
age, tbe cbildren’s performance pattern approached tbat uf
adults. Tbe yuungest chiléren aIread>’ blucked tbe MT
inference and, somewbat laten, they were impeded in DA.
Only adolescents were alíe tu bluck AC, presumably nuticing
[bat it led tu two incompatible models. These results suggest
that young ehildren can bujíd multiple mudeis, but tbey need
a greater wunking meniur>’ capacit>’ tu compare tbe
informatiun in Líe modeis.
General Conclusions
Ibree main eonciusions emerge frum our studies. Tbe
flrst conclusiun is <bat tbe results cunroburate uur extensiun
of the mudel tbeury. One ebange in tbe tbeury from its eanlier
formulatiun (Juhnsun-Laird & Eyrne, 1991) is [he
Inferen ces titaí can he Direcrly Derivad from ítem W¡titout
Inferences directí>’ derived from ¡he explíeit mental modeis
p; tberefore, Él
q: therefore, y.
not y; [berefure,noÉ Él.

















Note. MP = Modus Ponens; AC = Aff¡rming <be cunseÉluent; DA = Denying <be Antecedent; MT = Modus Tollcns.
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intruductiun uf strategic consideratiuns. Different individuals
tend tu develop diffenent strategies, wbicb influence tbe
urden in wbicb tbey process tbe premises and [be cunclusion
if une is given fur evaluation. Tbe>’ may also affect the way
individuals integrate infurrnation into modeis, as we
suggested in discussing ¡be results uf the studies witb
multiple cunditiunals and witb ¡he fuur sofls uf cunditiunal.
Tbis modificatiun ma>’ appear tu weaken tbe theur>’ in that
it makes it barder tu refute. Eut, in fact, tbe mecbanism
underlying Lbe different strategies appears tu depené un
mental models, and tbat is wb>’ number uf mudels remains
a cornenstune of [be tbeury.
Tbe secund cunciusion concems number of mudels. If
a study bad shown [bat the difficult>’ uf a set uf infenences
ran counter tu number of mudels, then [he mudel tbeury
wuuld bave been refuted. Rips’s (1990, 1994) studies merely
failed tu finé a predicted effect uf number uf mudels:
Inferences based on cunjunctiuns (une model) were no easier
than inferences based un disjunctiuns (two ur three models).
Tbis result [breaLenedtbe tbeuny (ané, su i¡ seemed tu us,
rule [heuries too). BuL, as uur studies have sbown, when
reasuners bave tu genera¡e ¡beir uwn conclusiuns, tbe mude!
¡heury’s predictions were vindicated. Ripss (1990) procedure
was no¡ sufficiently sensitive, un elicited a ceiling effect, tu
ée¡ec¡ tbe effect uf number of mudels. Likewise, uur resu!ts
wi¡b inferences based un multiple cunditiunals also
corrubora¡ed tbe effect uf number uf mudels.
Gun tbird conclusiun concenns tbe way in wbicb tu
develup the model tbeury. In general, witb Lbe introductiun
uf a new sentential cunnective, such as unless, tbe model
¡beonist’s task is tu furmulate its semantics, and Llie set uf
mental modeis (of possibilities) ¡u wbicb it refers. Thereafter,
¡be general mecbanisms uf the ¡beun>’ apply: The same
prucesses are used tu cuns¡ruct modeis, tu fonmulate
eunclusions, and tu ensure that tbe>’ are valid.
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